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Anejo 18

Santa Cruz de Marcenado

(1724-2024)

Coordinadores

Juan Díaz Álvarez

Pelayo Fernández García

Universidad de Oviedo

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Resumen

Con motivo del tercer centenario de la publicación del primer volumen de las *Reflexiones militares* del III marqués de Santa Cruz de Marcenado, se reúnen siete investigaciones que abordan su labor como diplomático en puestos de gran relevancia por diversas cortes europeas, la dimensión tratadística y militar como ámbito profesional en la que se desarrolla su servicio al Estado y la proyección y legado de su obra.

Palabras clave

Marqués de Santa Cruz de Marcenado, Iconografía, Historiografía, Historia militar, *Reflexiones militares*, Tratadística militar.

Santa Cruz de Marcenado (1724-2024)

Abstract

On the occasion of the third centenary of the publication of the first volume of the Military Reflections of the 3rd Marquis of Santa Cruz de Marcenado, seven research studies are brought together which deal with his work as a diplomat in positions of great importance at various European courts, the treatise and military dimension as a professional sphere in which his service to the State was carried out and the projection and legacy of his work.

Key words

Marquis of Santa Cruz de Marcenado, Iconography, Historiography, Military History, *Military Reflections*, Military treatise.

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Apéndice

Santa Cruz de Marcenado, the Rise of Savoy and the Spanish Resurgence in Italy under Philip V

Santa Cruz de Marcenado, el auge de Saboya y el resurgimiento español en Italia bajo Felipe V

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Abstract

Throughout the 1720s the Marquis de Santa Cruz was a hostage in Turin. This not only enabled him to complete his *Reflexiones militares* but also meant that he was a privileged observer of the Savoyard state and its ruler, Victor Amadeus II, who had transformed the international role and status of his state —and the strategic landscape of western Europe since c. 1690, becoming king of Sicily in 1713 (exchanged for previously Spanish Sardinia in 1720)—. This paper discusses (1) the impact of Santa Cruz's residence in Turin on the *Reflexiones militares*; (2) Santa Cruz's role in the negotiations for the return to Victor Amadeus of the artillery removed by the Spanish forces from Sardinia when they evacuated the island at the end of the War of the Quadruple Alliance (1718-1720), or compensation in lieu; (3) Santa Cruz' assessment of Victor Amadeus in his correspondence with Madrid and his urging the importance of securing that prince's support in the event of a war in Italy in pursuit of Philip V and Elizabeth Farnese's Italian ambitions following the conclusion of the peace of Vienna (1725) between Philip V and the Emperor Charles VI. The paper seeks to show that Santa Cruz was as perceptive a political observer and commentator as he was a military commentator and that he played a greater part than has been acknowledged hitherto in Philip V's Italian revanchism after 1713.

Keywords

Marquis of Santa Cruz de Marcenado, *Military Reflections*, Victor Amadeus II of Savoy, War of the Quadruple Alliance.

Resumen

Durante la mayor parte de la década de 1720, el marqués de Santa Cruz fue rehén en Turín. Esto no solo le permitió completar sus *Reflexiones militares*, sino que también significó que era un observador privilegiado del Estado saboyano y su gobernante, Víctor Amadeo II, que había transformado el papel internacional y el estatus de su Estado - y el panorama estratégico de Europa occidental desde c. 1690, convirtiéndose en rey de Sicilia en 1713 (intercambiado por la anteriormente española Cerdeña en 1720). Este artículo analiza (1) el impacto de la residencia de Santa Cruz en Turín en las *Reflexiones militares*; (2) el papel de Santa Cruz en las negociaciones para la devolución a Víctor Amadeo de la artillería retirada por las fuerzas españolas de Cerdeña cuando evacuaron la isla al final de la guerra de la Cuádruple Alianza (1718-1720), o la compensación en su lugar; (3) la valoración que Santa Cruz hace de Víctor Amadeo en su correspondencia con Madrid y su insistencia en la importancia de asegurarse el apoyo de este príncipe en caso de guerra en Italia en pos de las ambiciones italianas de Felipe V e Isabel Farnesio tras la conclusión de la paz de Viena (1725) entre

Felipe V y el emperador Carlos VI. El artículo pretende demostrar que Santa Cruz fue un observador y comentarista político tan perspicaz como militar y que desempeñó un papel más importante de lo que se ha reconocido hasta ahora en el revanchismo italiano de Felipe V después de 1713.

Palabras clave
Marqués de Santa Cruz de Marcenado, *Reflexiones militares*, Víctor Amadeo II de Saboya, Guerra de la Cuádruple Alianza.

Introduction

The career and experiences of the third Marquis of Santa Cruz de Marcenado (better known in his own lifetime as Viscount del Puerto) were not at all inevitable or predictable from his family background (Menéndez González, 2004; Díaz Álvarez, 2006). In many respects they reflect the fact that he was part of a generation in Spain, the generation of 1700, one whose attitudes and values were shaped in the reign of the last Habsburg, values which influenced their allegiances when forced to choose between Austrian Habsburg and Bourbon in and after 1700, and which continued to shape their conduct after the conclusion of the War of the Spanish Succession in 1713-1725.[1] In what follows I focus mainly on Santa Cruz's years of residence in Turin between 1721 and 1728, seeking to explain why he was there, what he was doing there, how it facilitated and shaped his *Reflexiones militare*s, and his broader response to that experience. I fit his Turin years into the bigger picture of Spanish policy under Philip V and —even more broadly— the European strategic landscape after 1688. Finally, I will draw attention to a Savoyard dimension of Spain's early eighteenth century history which is generally ignored.

The Strategic Importance of the Savoyard state

Santa Cruz would probably not have written the *Reflexiones militares* if he had not been resident in Turin, the capital of the Savoyard state, throughout the 1720s. But why was he there at all? He was there because of the relationship after 1713 between Spanish policy and the (new) strategic importance of the Savoyard state. The strategic and political importance of that state had been transformed since 1688, playing a key role in a succession of major European wars until its importance was undermined and its role sidelined following the so-called "Diplomatic Revolution" of 1756.

[1] On "generational" history, cf. Moreno Alonso, 1989: 11-16.

The key event in the emergence, or rise of Savoy was an earlier "diplomatic revolution" when in 1690 the then duke, Victor Amadeus II, switched alliances, abandoning France and joining Louis XIV's enemies in the Nine Years War, or War of the League of Augsburg (Carutti, 1897: 156-164, Handen, 1976: 241-260, Symcox, 1983: 100-105; Storrs, 1992: 347-383; Oresko, 1990: 251-178). For the half century before 1690 the Savoyard state - a typically "composite" state, comprising Piedmont, Savoy, Nice and Aosta (Symcox, 1983: 18-53, Storrs: 2000, 265-310; Raviola, 2013: 278-297, Bianchi y Merlotti, 2017: 19-60) —had been a satellite of the French Court, the capital (Turin) threatened by French forces in the fortresses of Pinerolo in Piedmont itself and (from 1681) Casale in neighbouring Monferrato—.

Savoy was important strategically because it gave access to the alpine passages between north Italy (the Po valley) and southern France. It might thus —with its army— the largest among the independent (non-Habsburg) states in Italy (Bianchi, 2008: 57-78), and the most obvious contender among them for the label "fiscal-military state" (Storrs, 2009: 201-235) —facilitate an invasion of France—. In 1692 the allies launched from Piedmont their only invasion of France during the Nine Years War. The invasion proved abortive but the continued threat of invasion obliged Louis XIV to divert south troops which might have ensured victory elsewhere, on the Rhine, in Flanders and in Catalonia. Louis XIV therefore bought off Victor Amadeus in 1696 with a separate peace which benefitted the duke and neutralised Italy (Carutti, 1897: 179-204, Canestrier, 1934: 370-392, Rowlands, 2000: 534-569), ending the diversion there and enabling Louis to concentrate his forces elsewhere and to take Barcelona in 1697 (Espino Lopez, 1999: 153-194). A general peace ending the Nine Years War was concluded later that same year, disappointing the allies of their more ambitious hopes of restraining Louis XIV, at Ryswick (McKay and Scott, 1983: 50-53), a clear indication of the way Victor Amadeus had transformed the European strategic landscape.

What happened in the War of the Spanish Succession was slightly different in detail to the experience of the Nine Years War but was essentially similar. In 1701, Victor Amadeus was again an ally of the Bourbons, his youngest daughter, Marie-Louise (1688-1714) marrying Philip V of Spain as the king's first wife (Sclopis, 1866, Perrero, 1876: 581-634, Symcox, 138-139; López Anguita, 2012: 447-459). But in 1703, just as in 1690, he switched allies, escaping Bourbon encirclement (France, Milan) and joining the anti-Bourbon Grand Alliance (Carutti, 1897: 285-301, Poumarede, 2016: 115-138). Louis XIV tried to force the Duke of Savoy out of the war, but without success and the defeat of the Bourbon forces outside Turin in 1706 was followed by the collapse of Spanish Milan (McKay, 1977: 101-102; Hochedlinger, 2003: 176-180; Quirós Rosado,

2017: 47-78). In 1707 the allies again invaded France from Piedmont, laying siege to Toulon, although the diversion of Austrian troops to the conquest of Naples contributed to the failure of the siege (Owen, 1938: 158-192, Veenendaal, 1971: 432-433, McKay, 1977, 102-106). Once again, the war in Savoy diverted French (and Spanish) troops which might have proved decisive elsewhere. Throughout the conflict, Louis XIV and Victor Amadeus' son-in-law, Philip V, sought to detach the duke from his allies by means of another advantageous separate peace, as in 1696 (Symcox, 1983: 143). However, on this occasion Victor Amadeus remained loyal to his allies. His reward in 1713, secured for him by Queen Anne's ministers, included the island kingdom of Sicily and royal status at last for himself and his dynasty (Carutti, 1897: 355-387, Gasco, 1935: 317-368, Fieldhouse, 1935: 278-291, Pitt, 1970: 466-467, Symcox, 1983: 157-170; Oresko, 1997: 272-350, Bély, 2013: 41-54, Torres Arce, 2014: 159-168).

By 1713 (in fact long before), by which time the Savoyard state had become established as a member of what has been called "Old System" of Grand Alliance against Bourbon France —and occasionally Spain— (Scott, 1989: 55-91), Victor Amadeus had —not surprisingly— astonished and impressed his contemporaries (Woolf, 1961: 211-258, Meyer, 2013: 167-184), including we might justifiably assume (although it is difficult to document) the almost thirty-year-old Santa Cruz. When he abdicated (1730) and died (in 1732, the same year as Santa Cruz), the Duke, now king, was widely regarded as one of the most astute and successful politicians of his age. According to the French diplomat, Blondel, who knew the king in Turin, Victor Amadeus was "le heros de son siècle". That reputation and impact was based on the Duke / king's enormous success in the previous decades in exploiting the strategic advantage offered by his dominions. As the British minister in Turin observed in the spring of 1725, "it is certain that no reasonable project upon Italy can be carryd on without the concurrence of the King of Sardinia".[2]

This brings me to what I call the "black legend" of the exceptional character and achievement of the Savoyard state and - more specifically —of Victor Amadeus himself (Storrs, 2008: 13-43)—. He, and some of his forebears and descendants - is often depicted as a sort of Machiavellian figure, an authoritarian and selfish manipulator and puppet master, standing apart from or outside the international struggle, intervening where and when he judged most advantageous to himself, his dynasty and his state, changing sides at his own convenience and with no sense of loyalty to allies or of obligation to respect treaty commitments (Torcellan Ginolino, 1961: 213-234). In the spring of 1725, the British

[2] The National Archives (TNA), State Papers (SP), series 92 (Savoy, Sardinia), vol. 31, fol. 455, Molesworth to Duke of Newcastle, Turin, 7 Apr 1725.

minister in Turin, informed the Secretary of State in London that if there was a war in Europe, Victor Amadeus, a prince "d'une experience et d'une prudence consommé", would weigh well all the consequences before committing himself.[3]

There is some truth in this image, but it is not wholly fair and in fact borders on caricature, for a number of very good reasons (Storrs: 2000). For one thing, the Savoyard state was still relatively small in size and limited in resources, not at all like the great powers: Austria, the Dutch Republic, England and later Prussia and Russia (McKay y Scott, 1983: 1, Scott, 2006: 1-7). In fact, successful exploitation of Savoy's strategic potential clearly depended on outside support, including subsidies from allies, like the Dutch Republic, England (Britain from 1707 following the union with Scotland), and in the Nine Years War, Spain (Storrs, 1999, Storrs, 2012a: 87-126) as well as the troops —and sometimes the ships and galleys of those same allies (Storrs, 1999: 59-60)—. Which brings us to England. The transformation of the role and importance of Savoy would not have happened without the parallel transformation of English foreign policy following the Glorious Revolution of 1688, what many historians have called the "second Hundred Years War" with France between 1688 and 1815, when England helped with its money and its fleet, its many allies —including Savoy— against France (and sometimes Spain) (Gibbs, 1967: 59-79, Black, 1983: 48-61, Storrs, 2014a: 13-30, 2014b, 21-35, Scott, 2002: 431-446).

Related to this imbalance of power, inferiority and dependency —an imbalance only partially offset by a generally impressive and widely admired Savoyard diplomacy (Storrs, 1999: 210-253)— the Duke of Savoy was never in fact able to stand completely above or apart from the European struggle as the "black legend" suggests. Often, as in 1690, for example, when Victor Amadeus' states were about to be invaded by Louis XIV's enemies from Spanish Milan, he could not remain neutral, he had to take sides whether he wanted to or not (Storrs, 1990: 199-214, 1992: 347-382). And whatever decision he made, whichever side he joined, it meant his states and subjects would suffer —at least in the short term—. French troops could also use the alpine passages, to invade Savoy, Nice was vulnerable from the sea, while Piedmont was open to invasion from Spanish and later Austrian Milan. Victor Amadeus and his successors made great efforts to strengthen the defences of their territories, building impressive fortifications on the frontiers (Storrs, 2013: 89-110), but in most of the wars fought by the Savoyard state, much of its territory —most often Nice and Savoy, but occasionally also great tracts of the heartland, Piedmont— was occupied at least initially by the enemy, Turin itself being besieged in 1705-1706 (Lameire, 1903: 42-200, De Rege Di Donato, 1909: 367-435, Revel, 1925: 98-248, Savio,

[3] TNA, SP 92, vol. 31, fol. 449, Molesworth to Duke of Newcastle, Turin, 28 Mar 1725.

1927: 34-142, Humbert, 1967: 13-97, Becchia, 2013: 13-40). A strategically important state is often also a vulnerable state, such that intervention was always a risk, a gamble, even if only in the short term (Hofler, 1876). Furthermore, outside help might come at a cost: the Protestant English and Dutch demanded concessions to the Duke's Protestant (Vaudois) subjects which created domestic undermined the confessional uniformity of the Savoyard state and which also complicated its relations with the Papacy (Viora, 1928: 81-135, Soffietti, 1990: 279-292). This vulnerability made for uncertainty and irresolution on the part of the Duke of Savoy, something which foreign diplomats in Turin often commented on (below). Victor Amadeus certainly wanted to take advantage of the broader European situation, but he was not always so certain as the "black legend" implies, of what the best, most advantageous, course was for him, his states and subjects. In fact, Victor Amadeus often sided —and was expected to side with— the strongest side, the one most likely to win and to reward him (Hofler, 1876: 171-173).

Otherwise, Victor Amadeus might in fact become a victim, as he did in the War of the Quadruple Alliance of 1718-1720, following the Spanish invasion of first Sardinia and then Sicily (Baraudon, 1896: 231-377, Tallone, 1933: 183-248, Alonso Aguilera, 1977, Symcox, 1983: 171-181, Storrs, 2016b: 5-6, 2022: 31-63).Victor Amadeus sought to take advantage of the situation, but he was isolated, without allies, in part because none of the other powers wanted another general war so soon after the War of the Spanish Succession, in part because many of them resented the way he had exploited — even betrayed - them in the past, a hostility which had earlier deprived him of a greater share in the English and Spanish successions (Storrs, 2016a: 227-254), in part because he was out-manoeuvred diplomatically. In consequence Victor Amadeus was made to pay the price of the other powers' prioritising of efforts to satisfy Philip V and Charles VI. Victor Amadeus was forced to exchange Sicily for the smaller and poorer island kingdom of Sardinia, whose only value to him was its crown. Victor Amadeus had visited Sicily in 1713-1714 to be crowned king, and he even thought of making Palermo his capital, but he never visited Sardinia. The exchange was a traumatic experience for Victor Amadeus (and his ministers), one which he resented, and one which he never forgot and never forgave: as Molesworth explained to lord Polwarth, one of the British plenipotentiaries at the congress of Cambrai in 1723, "your lordship cannot think him satisfy'd with so bad an exchange as Sardinia for Sicily" (Paton, 1940: 300).[4] The experience also reinforced the king's caution thereafter. Furthermore, throughout the 1720s

[4] Molesworth to lord Polwarth Turin, 25 Aug. 1723; TNA, SP 92, vol. 32, fols. 29-33, Hedges to Duke of Newcastle, Turin, 15 Nov 1726 NS.

Victor Amadeus feared another Spanish invasion of Sardinia, which he might have to surrender in another attempt of the other powers to satisfy the Spanish Court and avoid a general war, seeking a guarantee of his territories against both Philip V and Charles VI.[5] His fears were fuelled —for example in the spring of 1722— by reports of renewed military and naval preparations in Spain, which were widely thought to be aimed at Italy,[6] reports which sent the English minister in Turin hurrying to Genoa to try to find out more.[7]

Spanish Resurgence post 1713

Santa Cruz de Marcenado was also in Turin in the 1720s because of the place of the Savoyard state in the Italian aspirations of Philip V of Spain in an era when Italy was a source of great instability in Europe (Quazza, 1970: 138-154, León Sanz, 2022: 7-30). The War of the Spanish Succession had not gone so badly for Philip V, especially if we consider how desperate his situation had seemed in 1706 and again in 1710 —arguably the real turning point in the war, rather than as some argue 1707, the year of the Bourbon victory at Almansa (Díaz Paredes, 2022: XXI-XXXI)—. Philip retained Spain —but without Gibraltar and Menorca— and the Indies, although legal access to the latter was now granted to the British (Pitt, 1970: 475-476). However, he had lost almost all of those non-Spanish territories which had been such an integral part of the Spanish Habsburg Monarchy: Flanders, into which so much money and so many men had been poured before 1700, and Spanish Italy (Naples, Sicily, Milan, Sardinia). Not surprisingly, Philip, who had inherited the monarchy by right of Charles II's will, felt an obligation to recover those losses and thus restore the full inheritance left to him by the last Habsburg. Philip would certainly have welcomed the recovery of Flanders (Storrs, 2016b: 3, 170-171), but his revanchism was most pronounced in respect of Italy.

I have not so far referred to the ambitions of Philip's second wife, Elizabeth Farnese, although most historians emphasise her influence on —her domination of— Philip and his policy (Armstrong, 1892, Quazza, 1965: 19-24, Pérez Samper, 2003: 115-117). In fact, Philip's Italian ambitions predated his marriage with Elizabeth Farnese and were aimed at different territories to those which interested her; Parma and Tuscany, which had never been formally part of Spanish Italy. Similarly, Philip was far more interested in Spain's possessions

[5] TNA, SP 92, vol. 30, Molesworth to lord Carteret, Turin, 3 Dec. 1721.

[6] TNA SP 92, vol. 31, fol. 61, 88 Molesworth to lord Carteret, Turin, 28 Mar, 18 Apr., and 22 May, 1722.

[7] TNA, SP 92, vol. 31, fol. 92, Molesworth to lord Carteret, Genoa, 23 May 1722.

in North Africa than was his consort; indeed, if Philip had been less interested in Africa, Santa Cruz de Marcenado would probably not have died at Oran in 1732 (Storrs, 2016b: 4-5).

Philip was able to pursue his revanchist ambitions in Italy —becoming arguably the single greatest threat to the peace in western Europe between 1713 and 1748— in part because of his and his ministers' transformation of Spain during and after the War of the Spanish Succession: reforming and improving the army, the fleet and the finances (Storrs, 2012: 555-577). It was this revamped military and naval strength which enabled Philip to occupy Sardinia and invade Sicily between 1717 and 1720. Philip, like Victor Amadeus isolated and without allies, was forced by the Quadruple Alliance to yield, but he was promised a settlement which would establish his eldest son by Elizabeth Farnese, Don Carlos (the future Charles III), in Parma and Tuscany (Williams, 1930: 314-352, McKay, 1971: 264-284). However, Philip had not abandoned his own distinctive Italian ambitions. When Philip's troops left Sardinia in 1720, they removed virtually all of the island's heavy artillery, leaving the island virtually defenceless in the short term (Mattone, 1992: 75-76), and amply justifying Victor Amadeus's anxieties throughout the following decade about another Spanish conquest of the island and anxious to secure the return of the evacuated artillery.

Santa Cruz de Marcenado in Turin to 1725 and the *Reflexiones militares*

Santa Cruz removed from Sardinia to Turin in 1720-1721 as a hostage for a settlement of the Sardinian artillery issue. It was not unusual to take hostages to ensure the fulfilment of treaty terms, or when war broke out to ensure the safe return of a diplomat from the now enemy capital, the Spanish ambassador in Turin being held hostage for Victor Amadeus's own representative in Madrid when the Duke of Savoy switched alliances in 1703 (Poumarede, 2016b: 115-138) But why was Santa Cruz chosen as hostage in 1720 and not somebody else? Who made the decision? Was he chosen because of his connections —or lack of them— among the Spanish high command in Sardinia and Sicily in 1720, and/or at the Spanish Court? These are all questions which merit further research, which might throw invaluable light on the politics of the Spanish Court following the fall of Alberoni in 1719.

In Turin, Santa Cruz took on a diplomatic role of sorts, although he had no diplomatic training or experience. That was not so unusual, or problematic. Diplomacy was not then such a narrowly professional occupation. There were a growing number of what we might call professional, career diplomats, men whose lives were spent very largely as diplomats, but they were relatively few

in number; for many others, particularly among the noble elite, diplomacy was often just one employment in a very diverse career which might include military service. For some men, of course, a diplomatic posting it was a form of golden exile —Jovellanos was briefly threatened in the 1790s with a posting to Russia under Charles IV (Varela, 1988: 140-141)—.

Equally important was the fact that Santa Cruz did not have what contemporaries called a "character", that is to say he was not officially accredited as a diplomat in Turin and did not enjoy the formal privileges of those who were so accredited. In the spring of 1722, Victor Amadeus refused to receive the Marquis de Belgioioso, sent to Turin by the Governor of Milan but without a "character" from the Emperor, Charles VI (as was the practice in the time of the Spaniards).[8] In some respects that informal status made any task —negotiation— that he was entrusted with easier to carry out, because the more formal the position, and the more elevated the dignity within the hierarchy of diplomatic ranks (ambassador, envoy and so on), the more the individual's time was taken up with ceremony, something the Court of Turin was particularly sensitive about,[9] and was more public, such that his movements were very visible, especially to those seeking intelligence about what was going on, and watching closely to see with whom the prince and his ministers were talking.

But an unaccredited minister could play some part. In the spring of 1722, Molesworth suspected that the Prince of Masserano, one of the king of Sardinia's subjects who was serving as a general in the Spanish army (Bianchi, 2015: 248-273), and who had arrived in Turin from Spain under the pretence of his domestic affairs, brought advantageous proposals to Victor Amadeus from the Spanish Court.[10] And Santa Cruz did have an auxiliary role, supporting Philip V's minister in Genoa, the Marquis de San Felipe, author of the celebrated history of the War of the Spanish Succession, the *Commentaries*, in negotiating the return of the Sardinian artillery, or compensation for it, negotiations in which Victor Amadeus was promised the support of the British government.[11] These negotiations culminated in the conclusion of a convention providing for compensation in 1724 (San Felipe, 1957: 2, 315-316),[12] although it was not implemented by the Spanish Court, such that the Court of Turin was still pressing for payment of the agreed compensation well after Philip V's death in 1746. A deal was agreed by

[8] TNA, SP 92, vol. 31, fol. 81: Molesworth to lord Carteret, Turin, 18 Apr. 1722.

[9] TNA, SP 92, vol. 31, fols. 35, 389, 396, 407, 413: Molesworth to lord Carteret, Turin, 18 Feb 1722 and 2 Aug., 9 Sept, 21 Oct, 25 Nov and 6 Dec 1724.

[10] TNA, SP, 92 vol. 31, fol. 96: Molesworth to lord Carteret, Turin, 25 May 1722.

[11] TNA, SP, 92 vol. 30: Molesworth to lord Carteret, Turin, 12 July 1721.

[12] The agreement is not in the main treaty collections of Cantillo (for Spain) or Solaro (for the Savoyard state).

the Sardinian ambassador to the Spanish Court in 1753 (below) in the reign of Ferdinand VI, D. Giacinto Amedeo Porporato, cavaliere di San Peyre, whereby the Court of Turin would receive salt from Ibiza for its gabelle administration at a discounted price in lieu, but implementation of this agreement too proved complicated.[13]

But otherwise there was not much else for Santa Cruz to do, such that he had much leisure time. In recent years the history of diplomacy has been transformed. In the past historians were primarily interested in high political negotiations, but nowadays many are equally - even more - interested in diplomatic "culture" (Scott, 2007: 58-85), in sociability among the community of diplomats at individual Courts, and in the role of women, ambassadresses (Kuhnel, 2017: 130-146, Pohlig, 2022: 1062-1076). Unfortunately, in the case of Santa Cruz there is little scope for such approaches. Santa Cruz's wife accompanied him to Turin but our sources say nothing about her. And there was very little by way of a diplomatic community in Turin, especially in the early 1720s, nothing like the large community to be found in Rome, Paris, The Hague, London, and Madrid. The English envoy, John Molesworth who arrived in Turin at the end of 1720, was struck by the absence of other formally accredited diplomats, an absence due in part to a reluctance of some other states to recognise Victor Amadeus' new status as king of Sardinia, in part to the lack of business at a Court which —as Molesworth put it— was not "absolutely independent" and so "must have a necessary connection with the designs of more powerful princes".[14] This reflected the fact, too, that the peace of Europe was relatively untroubled, as England and France sought to mediate the differences between Philip V and Charles VI —and a host of other issues— at the Congress of Cambrai. For Molesworth, this meant that his regular reports to the secretary of state's office in London were little more than waste paper.[15] For its part, France was represented in Turin between December 1719 and the spring of 1725 by a mere secretary, whose low formal rank limited his own sphere of action and his influence in Turin (Horric de Beaucaire, XIV: 310-311).

There was so little to do in Turin in the early 1720s that between October 1722 and August 1723 and again between May 1725 and October 1726, the British minister, Molesworth went travelling in Italy, before returning home, such that there was no British minister in Turin for long periods, although Brit-

[13] Cf Instructions for conte della Torre, going as ambassador to the Court of Spain, 9 Sept. 1758, Archivio di Stato di Torino (AST), N, S, ms. 9/6; Instructions for chevalier Mos de Moran, going as ambassador to the Court of Spain, 9 Feb 1780, ms. 9/12; Instructions for conte Graneri, going as ambassador to the Court of Spain, 29 Nov. 1786, ms. 9/14.

[14] TNA, SP 92, vol. 30: Molesworth to lord Carteret, Turin, 19 Apr 1721.

[15] TNA, SP 92, vol. 30: Molesworth to lord Carteret, Turin, 20 Sept. 1721.

ish ministers could depend on the French minister there at a time of unusual Anglo-French co-operation, or entente (Black, 1986: 295-310) With so little else to do in Turin in the early 1720s, Santa Cruz was free to write. In that sense his residence in Turin made possible —in fact was crucial to— the completion of the *Reflexiones militares*.

It also shaped the *Reflexiones militares* in other ways. For one thing, Santa Cruz could consult the royal library in Turin, the *biblioteca reale*, should he need to check or (add to) any of the literary references scattered throughout the *Reflexiones*. He might also speak to Victor Amadeus and his ministers about the Savoyard experience in the War of the Spanish Succession, one of the pivotal moments of the conflict being the siege of Turin and the defeat of the besieging forces outside the city in 1706 (above). This helps in turn explain some of the content and focus of the *Reflexiones*. The war in Spain inevitably figures very largely among the many supporting examples in the *Reflexiones,* but Santa Cruz's residence in Turin may explain the many references to the war of succession in Piedmont (although I must confess that I have not done anything like a quantitative analysis of Santa Cruz' examples).[16] Thus in book five, chapter 7, Santa Cruz explained how the Imperial commander, Count Daun, despite lacking munitions, and men to fill gaps in the defences of the citadel, filled the ditch with wood from destroyed houses, which the besieging Bourbon forces were unable to overcome, and thus gained time in which Eugene of Savoy was able to reach and relieve Victor Amadeus's capital. But Santa Cruz also commented favourably on the military organisation of the Savoyard which surrounded him after 1713. In book thirteen, chapter seven, he commended the obligation of the inhabitants to provide material for the earthworks of the fortifications of Turin and elsewhere. In book three, chapter eleven, Santa Cruz praised Victor Amadeus's levy of provincial regiments (perhaps influencing the later introduction of such units in Spain itself; Storrs, 2016b: 34-37). Finally, the fact that Santa Cruz's concerns in Turin in the early 1720s included the negotiation of the artillery convention may explain some aspects of his discussion of artillery in the *Reflexiones* and his apparent mastery of that specific topic.

But residence in Turin also permitted Santa Cruz a closer observation of Victor Amadeus's regime more broadly than might otherwise have been the case —and he admired it—. Book seven, chapter 18, Santa Cruz referred to the provision for orphans which he had seen in Genoa (perhaps when visiting the city for the artillery negotiations?) and noted similar positive provisions in Turin.

[16] A recent monography on Santa Cruz presents several quantitative analyses of his *Reflexiones*' examples and influences (Fernández García, 2024: 159-176), however, none of them focuses on such details around these topics.

In book eight, chapter sixty, after praising Philip V's skill in retaining the loyalty of some Catalans during the general defection of that province, Santa Cruz spoke highly of Victor Amadeus's ability to when dealing with the revolt of his own province of Mondovi. Earlier, in Book 8, chapter seven, Santa Cruz wrote: "en Turín donde actualmente me hallo, observo que en el sapientísimo justo gobierno de la majestad de Victorio Amedeo se rinde tan cabal y pronta justicia al más miserable súbdito como al primer señor". In book thirteen, chapter one, devoted to the need to give immediate thanks to God after any victory, Santa Cruz praised Victor Amadeus' foundation of the monastery of Superga in the wake of the victory over the Bourbon forces outside Turin in 1706 (Messina, 1988: 237-270) While the dedication of a book might be inspired by a variety of factors, Santa Cruz' dedication of volume 9 of the *Reflexiones* (1727) to Victor Amadeus might be taken as further evidence of his admiration of that prince.

The Peace of Vienna and its Aftermath in Turin 1725-1728

The European political scene —and with it the pace of diplomatic activity in Turin— changed dramatically in 1725, with the conclusion in the spring of that year of the peace (or treaties) of Vienna between Philip V and Charles VI. Hitherto, since 1700 the defining element in western European international relations was the continuing quarrel between the two competitors for the Spanish monarchy. However, the failure of the Congress of Cambrai to settle their differences by the joint mediation of England and France, as agreed at the close of the War of the Quadruple Alliance, led to secret approaches between the two Courts, from the end of 1724, spearheaded by Ripperda and aimed at by-passing the mediators (Mur i Raurell, 2011: 56-60). These efforts were further stimulated —and distorted— when in the spring of 1725 the French Court sent back to Madrid the Infanta Mariana Victoria, the child bride of Louis XV, in order to have the king marry and secure the succession (Baudrillart, III: 143-167). The Infanta's parents, Philip V and Elizabeth Farnese, were outraged, the latter possibly more than the monarch himself, such that the Duke of Ripperda was able to conclude a deal in Vienna which made far more concessions to the Imperial Court than might otherwise have been the case. The peace, a remarkable but relatively neglected "diplomatic revolution", transformed the international situation. The Congress of Cambrai was rendered redundant —the Spanish Court would no longer accept French mediation after the repudiation and return of the Infanta, while the British would not continue to mediate without them, and anyway the Spanish and Imperial Courts had apparently resolved the most important issue under discussion at Cambrai— and was closed (Mur i Raurell, 2011: 18-24).

But the peace did not bring peace. Instead the later 1720s was characterised by a new "Cold War" in Europe in which there was a constant expectation of a new war. The Spanish commercial concessions to the Emperor's Ostend Company (Hertz, 1907: 255-729; Gibbs, 1958: 404-430), the prospect of the marriage of Don Carlos with one of the Emperor's daughters and of his inheriting the Austrian Habsburg lands on the death of Charles VI, resurrecting the empire of Charles V, along with other concerns prompted England and France to conclude their own alliance, the so-called alliance of Hanover. Europe split into two rival camps, each looking for allies elsewhere, in Germany, Italy, Scandinavia and elsewhere (as seen in the various works of James Frederick Chance).

Italy really meant Victor Amadeus. The rival alliances of Vienna and Hanover sought to gain Victor Amadeus, because without him they could not hope to wage war successfully in Italy. There was a new round of intense diplomatic activity in Turin, with the arrival of Comte de Cambis from France in the spring of 1725, of Hedges from England, and of Count Harrach from Vienna in 1726 (the Court of Spain still lacked a formally accredited minister in Turin). Santa Cruz was not a key player in these negotiations —and continued to write the *Reflexiones*, as well as sending to Madrid (1727) at least one project identifying measures to stimulate Spain's industry, population, trade and marine[17]— but he received Victor Amadeus' confidences (and implied approaches to the Spanish Court) and sent useful intelligence of Victor Amadeus' military preparations from Turin.[18] He also had a clear view of what policy / strategy the Spanish Court should pursue and used his correspondence with the secretary of state in Madrid to press his view on his own Court. Santa Cruz favoured the Savoyard alliance and argued that satisfying Victor Amadeus on the matter of the compensation for the artillery —which the Duke frequently raised with him, to Santa Cruz' embarrassment—[19] would be crucial in determining the king of Sardinia's choice between the two armed camps[20] (in what might be a nod to suspicions of Victor Amadeus' trustworthiness and dependability, based on the events of 1690, 1696 and 1703, Santa Cruz argued that France had a far worse record of betraying allies). In making his case for the Savoyard connection in his letters, Santa Cruz revealed that he was not just an able analyst of narrowly conceived military matters but also a shrewd commentator on broader strategic issues, his analysis clearly founded on a good grasp of the history of the last generation, the one during which he had reached maturity. It could, of course, be argued that his insight was obvious to any contemporary with knowledge and understanding

[17] Archivo General de Simancas (AGS), Estado (E), leg. 5280: Santa Cruz to La Paz, 26 June 1727.
[18] AGS, E, leg. 5280: Santa Cruz to Grimaldo, Turin, 8 May 1726, and to La Paz, 7 Aug. 1726.
[19] Archivo Histórico Nacional (AHN), Estado (E), leg. 3822: Santa Cruz to [Grimaldo], Turin, 23 May 1725.
[20] AHN, E, leg. 3822: Santa Cruz to [Grimaldo], Turin, 10 May 1725, 2 Jan 1726.

of recent history. It could also be argued that he was hoping to be commissioned to negotiate Victor Amadeus' entry into the alliance of Vienna. Whatever the explanation, Santa Cruz had a view and was prepared to press it from a distance in Madrid.

But that was not the limit of Santa Cruz's activity in Turin at this time. Following the outbreak of a war between Britain and Spain in 1727, one which involved little more than the siege of Gibraltar, Santa Cruz —still apparently acting unofficially— championed the Spanish besiegers against the British minister in Turin. According to Hedges, writing to London in the spring of 1727, "we have a Spanish Don here" —Hedges' first reference to Santa Cruz— who besieges Gibraltar every day at Court and takes it in half an hour except I happen to come in to its relief, and then it holds out till the next day when he infallibly storms it again. He is charged with the King of Spain's affairs here and has been here for 12 years as hostage for some cannon due to the King of Sardinia… which the King of Spain will never exchange for him and so he has a certain demonstration what his master thinks him not worth". The following month, Hedges thanked Newcastle's secretary for sending him a plan of Gibraltar, which he showed in Turin, "but they think it a finesse, only done to countermine a Spaniard here [Santa Cruz] who has taken the town and destroyed our squadron 5 or 6 times since it was besieged" [21] Hedges' account of Santa Cruz is not wholly correct and may be a little unfair (not to say comic), but the description of him championing the Spanish attempt on Gibraltar gives us an invaluable glimpse of what else Santa Cruz was up to in Turin while writing the *Reflexiones*, and suggests a comparison with that other Spanish exile and fierce conservative and revanchist patriot, Macanaz (Storrs, 2010: 115-138).

This phase of Santa Cruz's career ended when, following this brief war between England and Spain in 1727, a draft peace settlement was agreed which was to turned into a definitive peace settlement at another congress, to be held at Soissons. Santa Cruz, whose advice to his own Court (above) to win over Victor Amadeus had clearly not been acted on, while Victor Amadeus himself ultimately proved too cautious to opt for either side, despite some attractive offers —demonstrating that uncertainty and caution referred to earlier—, was appointed as one of the three Spanish plenipotentiaries to a new congress. His appointment may have been influenced by his residence in Turin. (According to Erizzo, who also noted that Santa Cruz had been a hostage in Turin, the marquis' appointment as plenipotentiary did not meet with universal approval.)[22]

[21] TNA, SP 92, vol. 32, f. 176, 187: Hedges to Delafaye, Turin, 5 Apr and 3 May 1727

[22] British Library (BL), Additional (Add), Manuscripts (Mss), vol. 27330, fols. 41, 46: Erizzo to Doge and Senate, Madrid, 19 and 28 July 1727.

In August 1727, in anticipation of the opening of the congress, the English minister in Turin, Hedges, sent to the London a brief character sketch of Santa Cruz, a fuller account of the latter than was contained in any of Hedges' previous letters. According to Hedges, Santa Cruz had little to do in Turin and seldom appeared at Court, although he got on well with Victor Amadeus. He was always received by the king without ceremony, having no public character. Santa Cruz had spent most of his time studying, he had already published in Turin 8 or 9 volumes of the Art of War in Spain, a reference to the *Reflexiones militares*, and had recently undertaken to publish a Dictionary to comprehend the Arts and Sciences. Hedges had seen Santa Cruz frequently before the siege of Gibraltar (so, some sociability) less often while England and Spain were at war, but more frequently again recently. Santa Cruz, wrote Hedges, always seemed to regret the state Spain was reduced to by Elizabeth Farnese and by the great sums of money sent to the Emperor (since 1725). Equally interesting as an insight into Santa Cruz's character was Hedges' description of him as very talkative such that it wasn't difficult to get him to tell what he knew —an invaluable hint to the British negotiators at Soissons— although he could not tell much, because no affair of consequence had ever been entrusted to him. Giving an example of Santa Cruz's openness, Hedges reported that at dinner some days before, Santa Cruz had received a packet from Madrid which he read to Hedges, an account of Philip V's health, his melancholy and his inclination to abdicate a second time, which was only prevented by the queen. According to Hedges, Santa Cruz was ordered to leave for Paris early the next month, September, to receive instructions and meet the other (Spanish) plenipotentiaries.[23]

This was the end of Santa Cruz's sojourn in Turin. From the spring of 1728, a useful insight into Santa Cruz and his activity at Soissons (or rather at Paris where most of the real work of negotiating was done) is offered by the English plenipotentiaries to the congress. In February 1729 Stephen Poyntz reported that Macanaz, whose recall to Spain had long been pressed by Cardinal Fleury, and Santa Cruz were closely united, that they were encouraged by the King of Spain, and that they had a direct secret correspondence with the Court of the Prince of Asturias. Still according to Poyntz, Santa Cruz and Macanaz had sought to protract the negotiations in the hope that Philip V would abdicate on his return (from Badajoz for the marriage of the Prince) and that Spain would then join the Alliance of Hanover against the Emperor and then regain its lost territories in Europe.[24] This intriguing insight merits further investigation, not least for the

[23] TNA, SP, 92, vol. 32, fol. 268-69: Hedges to Duke of Newcastle, Turin, 9 Aug. 1727.

[24] TNA, SP, 78 (France), vol. 190, fol. 133: Stephen Poyntz to Benjamin Keene, Paris, 5 Feb 1729.

retrospective light it throws on Santa Cruz's Turin years, as does the account of Santa Cruz provided by one of the Imperial plenipotentiaries, Baron Fonseca, in November 1730, the latter exploiting that readiness to talk of Santa Cruz noted by Hedges in 1727 to probe divisions within the Spanish negotiating team at the congress (Hofler, 1876: 284-286, Fernández García, 2024: 109-110).

Early Bourbon Spain's "Hora Piamontesa"?

Santa Cruz's absence from Madrid for an entire decade in the 1720s did not mean that he did not maintain a presence there, with his correspondence with the Secretary of State and others, or that he did not continue to court favour in Madrid, including by means of his dedications of successive volumes of the *Reflexiones militares* —to Philip V, the future Ferdinand VI, and the future Charles III— when they were published in Turin.[25] But I want to draw attention to an aspect of both Louis and Ferdinand's background and identity that is not sufficiently acknowledged, the fact that they were both members of the house of Savoy (and aware of themselves as such), as much as they were members of the house of Bourbon. Their mother was Victor Amadeus II's younger daughter, and Victor Amadeus their grandfather. In the summer of 1728 Victor Amadeus sent a minister to Madrid, the marquis d'Arvillars. According to the Venetian ambassador in Madrid, Erizzo, Arvillars supposedly came to secure payment of the compensation still owing for the removal of artillery from Sardinia, but some thought it was really because some expected Philip V to abdicate a second time, and Victor Amadeus wanted to exploit the close family link with the Prince of Asturias.[26] Victor Amadeus hoped his representative would be treated as an "ambassador di famiglia", enjoying privileges denied to other members of the diplomatic community at the Spanish Court, but his successor was still pressing for this after the death of Philip V.[27] Among the matters Arvillars reported back to Turin, soon after his arrival in Madrid, was an abortive measure, attributed to Elizabeth Farnese, whereby Philip V would partition Spain, giving the Aragonese territories to Don Carlos in effect as a separate dominion.[28]

Elizabeth Farnese clearly did not favour the interests of Philip V's children by his first wife, since they preceded her own children in Spain. This may be one reason why Philip and Elizabeth largely ignored Santa Cruz's advice that they

[25] An analysis of such dedications can be found in Fernández García, 2024: 151-158.

[26] BL, Add, Mss, 27330, fol. 192-96: Erizzo to Doge and Senate, Madrid, 6 Aug. 1728.

[27] BL, Add, Mss, 27331, fol. 99: Erizzo to Doge and Senate, Badajoz, 25 Jan 1729**;** marchese Gorzegno to cav. Ossorio, 26 Apr 1749, AST, N, S, ms. 9/1.

[28] BL, Add, Mss, 27331, fol. 1**:** Erizzo to Doge and Senate, Madrid, 21 August 1728.

should seek to win over the King of Sardinia. After Victor Amadeus abdicated (in 1730) they also made little effort to court his son and successor (Ferdinand VI's uncle), Charles Emanuel III. This was evident in the War of the Polish Succession, when Charles Emanuel and Philip V were both allies of France (against Charles VI) but not with each other, France subsequently ending the war by a separate peace with the Emperor in part because of the competing and incompatible interests of the Courts of Madrid and Turin. As far as Philip V and Elizabeth Farnese were concerned the King of Sardinia was a rival in Italy (Quazza, 1965: 235-302, McKay and Scott, 1983: 141-154). There were some efforts to secure Charles Emanuel III for the Bourbon cause, at the start of the War of the Austrian Succession, but they proved abortive and for most of that war Spanish troops occupied the duchy of Savoy (Baudrillart, v: 463-480; Lodge, 1930: 31-79, Revel, 1925: 98-248, Becchia, 2007). It was only the death of Philip V in 1746 and the accession of Ferdinand VI which ended —temporarily at least— the Spanish Court's desire to upset the political arrangement of Italy.

In 1752 the Courts of Madrid, Vienna and Turin concluded the convention of Aranjuez recognising each other's position in Italy (Rice, 1989: 105-07, Scott, 2006: 73-74, Cantillo, 1843: 412-415, Solaro, 1835: 128-138). This transformation of Spain's attitude towards Italy and the Court of Turin owed much to disappointment in Spain with France's performance in the War of the Austrian Succession and Ferdinand's decision to prioritise the Atlantic and to abandon a policy which prioritised the interests of his stepmother, Elizabeth Farnese and her children (Gómez Urdáñez, 2001: 45-124, 145-216). That shift of focus might also be related to Ferdinand's sense of his own Savoyard rather than Bourbon ancestry and identity. There are other indications of Ferdinand's Savoyard inclination. In the summer of 1748, before the conclusion of the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, the Spanish Court proposed to that of Turin the marriage of one of Ferdinand's half-sisters, the Infanta Maria Antonia Ferdinanda, with Charles Emanuel III's son (and Ferdinand's cousin) the future king Victor Amadeus III, initiating negotiations which concluded successfully in 1750 (Cordero di Pamparato, 1897-98: 98-120). In addition, 1753 saw another attempt to settle the debt still owed for the Sardinian artillery according to the convention of 1724. Finally, following the death of Ferdinand's consort, Barbara of Braganza, there was talk —indeed hope in Turin— that the widowed and uxorious Ferdinand might find a second wife among his Savoyard cousins.[29] Unfortunately for the Court of Turin Ferdinand died before this objective was achieved. If such a marriage had occurred and if Santa Cruz had still been live, he might —we can only speculate— have enjoyed a more important political role precisely because

[29] Instructions for conte della Torre, going as ambassador to Madrid, 9 Sept 1758, AST, N, S, m. 9/6.

of his Turin experience, but Ferdinand's own death in 1759 extinguished what we might think of as the brief "Savoyard moment" —or "hora piamontesa"— in eighteenth century Spain.

Conclusion

Santa Cruz de Marcenado's presence in Turin for most of the 1720s was due primarily to the emergence of Savoy as a strategically important power since 1688 and Spanish revanchism in Italy following the losses sustained in the War of the Spanish Succession. Santa Cruz's residence in Turin clearly not only facilitated his writing of the *Reflexiones militares*, but also helped to shape its content. Santa Cruz revealed a clear grasp of the transformed importance of the Savoyard state in the "Cold War" of the later 1720s. It is arguable that this was in fact a common place of contemporary political analysis, but it suggests that he was as opiniated and shrewd a political as he was a military commentator. His years of residence in Turin certainly made him a champion (at a distance) of the Savoyard alliance in the policy debate going on at the Spanish Court in the later 1720s. While Santa Cruz's experience in Turin was used at Soissons (or might have been if the congress had not soon been sidelined) Philip V and his second consort failed to make more of the asset he represented after his residence in Turin, in large part because they resented the rivalry of the house of Savoy in Italy. Their hostility was not shared by Ferdinand VI in whose reign Santa Cruz might —we can only speculate— have enjoyed a more important political role precisely because of his Turin experience if he had not died in 1732.

There is more to be discovered about Santa Cruz de Marcenado, not least by looking at the correspondence of those Savoyard ministers and of those other foreign diplomats —Dutch, French, Imperial, Venetian and others— who knew him in Turin. I would also like to make the case —finally— for a history of the Spanish generation of 1700, the men and women who grew up in and were shaped by the reign of Charles II and who faced the challenge of the War of the Spanish Succession: in addition to Santa Cruz de Marcenado, I think of Macanaz, born in 1670. But there were many, many others who might underpin a generational history of this sort.

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